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Abstract: We discuss the possibility of making the initial definitions
of mutually different (possibly interacting, or even entangled) systems in
the context of decoherence theory. We point out relativity of the concept
of elementary physical system as well as point out complementarity of the
different possible divisions of a composite system into ”subsystems”, thus
eventually sharpening the issue of ’what is system’.
1. Introduction. Physical system is described by its parameters (e.g.,
mass, electric charge etc.) and by the degrees of freedom properly describing
dynamics of the system. In the classical world, this general scheme seems
inevitable. Nevertheless, in the quantum realm, the things may be different
as we show within the context of the ”environment-induced superselection
rules” (or decoherence) theory.
Actually, the task of dividing complex systems into subsystems is not
in general trivial. This fundamental yet a subtle task can be performed in
some generality on the basis of the decoherence theory, yet bearing certain
open questions. E. g. a composite system C may not be divisable in re-
spect to the arbitrarily defined ”degrees of freedom”, thus–relative to these
degrees of freedom–being an elementary physical system (likewise the ele-
mentary particles). On the other side, the possible (meaningful) division of
C into subsystems need not, in principle, be unique, thus posing the question
of physical reality of the ”subsystems” emerging from the different possible
divisions of C. Bearing in mind that the real systems are usually open sys-
tems, the task of defining ”subsystem” coincides with the task of defining
”system”.
The method employed here is elementary yet conceptually sufficient for
addressing the truly fundamental issue of ”what is system” within the context
of quantum mechanics of complex systems.
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2. The problem. Most of the ”quantum paradoxes” start with the as-
sumption of existence of mutually separable physical systems. On the other
side, quantum holism removes most of the problems (except on the intuitive
level) from the very beginning–being a consequence of the fully consistent
quantum mechanical formalism (e.g. of the quantum entanglement). In the
macroscopic domain, however, existence of the well-defined, mutually sepa-
rated systems is the very basis of the physical methods and is actually taken
for granted. Thus, in a sense, transferring the concept of the different sys-
tems from the macroscopic, through the mesoscopic, to the purely quantum-
mechanical domain is at the heart of the problem of the ”transition from
quantum to classical” [1-3]. This is also a problem of practical importance–
since, it seems, that in the realistic situations, we are able to distinguish
between the different systems (e.g. between the object of measurement and
the measurement instrument).
The possibility of defining mutually independent (compatible) degrees of
freedom (and their conjugate momenta) and of performing independent (”lo-
cal”) measurements of the observables is a defining feature of the different
physical systems. The importance of the issue is rather apparent. E.g. ac-
cording to Zurek [2]: ”...[quantum mechanical] problems... cannot be even
posed when we refuse to acknowledge the division of the Universe into sepa-
rate entities”, while ”..without the assumption of a preexisting division of the
Universe into individual systems the requirement that they have a right to
their own states cannot be even formulated”. Of course, the rules for defining
the preferred states (e.g. the pointer basis, as well as the pointer observable)
of an open system comes from the foundations of the decoherence theory. On
this basis appeared an early draft [4] of the problem considered here.
This issue should be distinguished from the problem of the loss of indi-
viduality of mutually entangled systems. Actually, the entangled states refer
to the, initially, well-defined systems: the systems (actually subsystems) are
usually assumed already to be defined, as well as their state spaces, which is
the basis for defining the entangled states. So, in this perspective, the task
of answering ’what is system’ is a more fundamental task than investigation
of entanglement itself.
Essentially the same problem has recently been addressed e.g. by Zanardi
et al [5] and by Barnum et al [6] (and the references therein), by consider-
ing the different possible operational uses of entanglement in the quantum
information issues. While bearing some similarity with our results, the re-
sults therein presented are based on the different approaches that is briefly
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discussed in Section 5. Here, we employ the foundations of the decoherence
theory and particularly certain recent results in this regard [4, 7, 8].
3. Separability. As implicit in the above quotation of Zurek, the initial
definitions of the subsystems make sense if one can a posteriori justify these
definitions on the basis of the occurrence of decoherence. The relevance of
this statement seems to be apparent in the macroscopic, not necessarily yet
in the mesoscopic or microscopic (fully quantum mechanical) context.
A detailed analysis of the occurrence of decoherence points out the condi-
tion of separability (cf. DEF. 1 below) of the interaction term of the Hamilto-
nian as the (effective) necessary condition for the occurrence of decoherence.
Investigating the occurrence of decoherence is truly a subtle task [7-9]. E.g.,
separability of the complete Hamiltonian (of the composite system ”system
+ environment”) is sufficient in this regard [7, 8]. Strong interaction allows
the occurrence of decoherence. which still depends on a number of the de-
tails in the model of the system [7]. On the other side, strong interaction is
not necessary for the occurrence of decoherence [9]. Nevertheless, the condi-
tion of separability in the ’macroscopic context’ of the theory represents an
(effective) necessary condition for the occurrence of decoherence [8].
Now, the separability appears as a condition useful for defining the ’divid-
ing line’ between the subsystems. Formally, existence of the subsystems is
presented (cf. (1) below) by the tensor-product symbol, ⊗, while assuming
the definitions of the subsystems through their–implicitly present–degrees of
freedom.
DEF. 1: A bipartite (1 + 2) system’s observable Aˆ12 is of the separable
kind, if its general form
Aˆ12 =
∑
i
Bˆ1i ⊗ Cˆ2i, (1)
fulfills any of the following, mutually equivalent conditions: (A) Its spectral
form reads
∑
i,j aijPˆ1i ⊗ Πˆ2j , where appear the (orthogonal) projectors onto
the Hilbert spaces of the two systems; (B) there exist the two orthonormal
bases in the state spaces of the systems, {|i〉1}, and {|α〉2} that diagonalize
the observable: 1〈i|Aˆ12|j〉1 = 0, ∀i 6= j, and 2〈α|Aˆ12|β〉2 = 0, ∀α 6= β; (C)
every pair of the observable of the system 1 in (1) mutually commute, and
analogously for the system 2.
A constructive proof of existence of the general form (1) of a bipartite
system’s observable is given in [8]. Depending on the actual task, any of these
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definitions of separability may equally be operationally useful. Needless to
say, a bipartite system’s Hamiltonian is subject to DEF. 1.
Thereforre, operationally, investigating separability of the Hamiltonian
gives rise to both [7, 8]: (i) to the superselection rules defined by the pro-
jectors {Pˆ1i} (when the system 1 is considered as the open system), and (ii)
to a definition of the pointer observable and therefore of the possible pointer
basis (or of the ”preferred set of states”) of the open system–e.g. the system
1 in our notation). Having in mind that the observables, e.g. Bˆ1s, are the
functions of the degrees of freedom of the system 1, the task of investigating
decoherence actually assumes the initially well-defined (sub)systems.
Bearing in mind the subtleties concerning the occurrence of decoherence,
we simplify our approach: actually, we employ the condition of separability as
a criterion for making the dividing line between the subsystems of a composite
system.
4. Quantum relativity of ”system”. Usefulness of separability in the
foundations of decoherence theory bears some subtlety yet. The example of
the hydrogen atom is paradigmatic in the following sense. The composite
system ”hydrogen atom (HA)” is originally defined by the Hamiltonian:
Hˆ = Tˆe ⊗ Iˆp + Iˆe ⊗ Tˆp + VˆCoul, (2)
where the Coulomb interaction couples the positions of the electron (sub-
script e) and the proton (subscript p), bearing obvious notation. Having in
mind the definition of separability (Section 3), it is straightforward to prove
non-separability of Hˆ yet separability of the Coulomb interaction1.
However, the proper canonical transformations of the degrees of freedom
give another, separable form of Hˆ ; even more, each single term is (apparently)
of the separable kind:
Hˆ = TˆCM ⊗ IˆR + IˆCM ⊗ TˆR + IˆCM ⊗ VCoul(rˆR), (3)
where CM stands for the ”center of mass” and R for the ”relative particle”
system; rR ≡ |~re − ~rp|.
In the context of our considerations, these well-known transformations
give rise to the following observation. The composite system HA is decom-
1The strength of the separable interaction term gives rise to the bound states and the
interpretation of HA as distinguished in the body text.
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posable2 into the pair of the quantum particles (e, p), stemming from separa-
bility of the strong Coulomb interaction (cf. footnote 1). On the other side,
the form (3) of the Hamiltonian refers to the new, also well known, division
of HA: the system now reads ”Center of mass + relative particle” (CM+R);
certainly, e+p = C = CM+R. Due to the small mass-ratio–me/mp ≪ 1–it is
(semiclassicly) allowed to ”identify” CM with p and R with e. Nevertheless,
in general, this identification is not physically reasonable, as we show in the
sequel. From this example, we learn:
the choice of the degrees of freedom may redefine the Hamiltonian separability,
thus (cf. Section 3) directly referring to the issue of putting the dividing line
between the (sub)systems.
Let us first briefly consider the case of totally nonseparable Hamiltonian.
That is, we assume that a given Hamiltonian can not be (re)written in a
separable form by the use of any (linear) canonical transformations. As to
the told in Sections 2 and 3, then one can not define a dividing line between
the ”subsystems” of the composite system defined by the Hamiltonian con-
sidered. Then, it seems we are forced to consider the system undivisable, thus
resembling the concept of elementarity of the quantum particles. Physically,
a definition of the subsystems in this case is artificial, and the measurements
of the ”subsystems’ observables” is nothing but the measurements of the
observables of the composite system, not yet interpretable in terms of the
observables of the well-defined subsystems.
As a counterexample, let us analyse the following possibility. A Hamil-
tonian is separable relative to a set of the ”degrees of freedom” (and their
conjugate momenta), (xˆAi, pˆAj; ξˆBm, πˆBn), thus defining a division of the com-
posite system as C = A + B; by definition, [xˆAi, pˆAj] = ıh¯δij (and analo-
gously for B), while [xˆAi, ξˆBm] = 0 and [xˆAi, πˆBn] = 0 (and analogously for
pˆAs). But, suppose that the same Hamiltonian can be rewritten in a sepa-
rable form relative to another (analogous) set of the ”degrees of freedom”,
(XˆDp, PˆDq; ζˆEα, ΠˆEβ), thus giving rise to another possible division of the com-
posite system, C = D+ E . By the assumption: the two sets of the degrees of
freedom are mutually related by the linear canonical transformations
ζˆEα = fα(xˆAi, pˆAj ; ξˆBm, πˆBn), ΠˆEβ = gβ(xˆAi, pˆAj; ξˆBm, πˆBn), (4)
2Here, we do not assume the occurrence of decoherence in HA–the proton is much too
small in order to play the role of the environment for the electron. We just formally employ
the separability of the Coulomb interaction to point out consistency of our considerations.
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and analogously for the subsystem D, while assuming the inverse is also
defined. Needless to say, the measurements of e.g. xˆAi, or ζˆDp, may be
interpreted as the measurements of the observables of the composite system.
Yet, the supposed separabilities of the Hamiltonian allow the interpretations
in terms of the subsystems, again bearing some subtlety.
In general, the measurements of e.g. the observables of A partly reveal,
yet quantum mechanically undetermined values of the observables of both D
and E–due to (4), one may obtain e.g. [xˆAi, ζˆDα] 6= 0. As a consequence: the
inverse of (4) can not be used for determining the definite values of the ob-
servables of D and E–in contradistinction with the macroscopic experience.
On the other side, only the measurements of A and B (of D and E) do not
mutually interfere, referring to the mutually compatible observables. There-
fore, the measurements of the observables of the ”subsystems” belonging to
the different divisions do not make sense, while the measurements referring
to the observables of the subsystems belonging to the same division of the
composite system are physically reasonable. Needless to say, the later is in
agreement with the standard, general procedure we have learnt in the ”clas-
sical domain” (Section 2–cf. also Section 5). As a consequence, the two
possible divisions may refer to the two, mutually complementary, possible
entanglements in the system C:
∑
i ci|ψi〉A ⊗ |χi〉B, and
∑
j dj|ψj〉D ⊗ |φj〉E
(compare to [5, 6]).
As long as the composite system may be considered to be isolated, the
two different divisions as described above seem mutually equivalent for an
independent observer. This, however, need not be the case for an open
composite system, as discussed in [10].
It is probably obvious: a definition of e.g. subsystem A makes sense if
and only if the subsystem B is simultaneously defined. This is both a math-
ematical consequence of the canonical transformations as well as physically
a reasonable notion.
Therefore, the concept of elementarity as well as of a subsystem are rela-
tive; as to the later, bearing in mind that the real systems are usually open,
the relativity of ”subsystem” actually means relativity of the basic physical
concept of ”system”.
5. Discussion. Depending on the context, we hope the use of the term
”separability” is clear–since it applies to both, the total Hamiltonian as
well as to any (e.g. interaction) term of the Hamiltonian. Since this is
not substantial, we do not explicitly distinguish between these possibilities
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throughout the paper. So, for simplicity, we assume that ’(non)separability’
(non)defines the ’dividing line’–which is the main operational tool of our
analysis.
Originally, the problem of ”what is system” (Section 2) stems from the
”macroscopic context” of the decoherence theory [1-3]. It seems that, nowa-
days, the physicists are ready to accept the ”undivised universe” on the truly
microscopic, and partly on the ”mesoscopic” scale. Yet, in the context of the
”macroscopic considerations”, it seems unplausible to start with such a hy-
pothesis [1, 3]. Therefore, our conclusions mainly refer to the macroscopic
context of the decoherence theory; investigating their extension towards the
fully quantum mechanical scales remains an open task of our analysis. To
this end, the above distinguished use of the condition of separability may be
employed as a (plausible) working hypothesis.
Following the fundamentals of the decoherence theory (yet mainly in the
macroscopic context), we have argued that the condition of separability of
the Hamiltonian may serve as a criterion for making a ”division line” be-
tween the susbsystems of a composite system. As we here emphasize, this
reasonable approach gives automatically rise to the possibility of defining
the subsystems, through a definition of the degrees of freedom (and their
conjugate momenta) that are based on the condition of separability of the
Hamiltonian. We have also seen that the condition of separability is consis-
tent with our macroscopic experience: e.g. the measurements on B (A) may
be performed independently on the measurements on the subsystem A (B); as
a benefit, the subsystem B (A) may be defined only simultaneously with the
subsystem A (B). The different divisions of the composite system may bear
quantum mechanical complementarity, being mutually exclusive divisions of
a composite system. This way, the problem of ”what is system” seems to be
sharpened, and particularly reduced to the following problem: ”as to what
extent, one may ascribe the physical reality to the different divisions of a
composite system, especially in the ’macroscopic’ context”. Needless to say,
much remains yet to be done in this respect. To this end, the example of the
hydrogen atom is useful both, as an example of applicability of our general
models to the realistic systems as well as an example exhibiting the subtleties
in the same concern. As to the later, the strength and separability of the
Coulomb interactions relative to the degrees of freedom of the pair (e, p) jus-
tify the division of the atom into the pair ”electron + proton” (cf. footnotes
1 and 2). Nevertheless, in general, identification of the subsystems referring
to the different divisions of the composite system (semi-classically plausible
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identification: CM = p, and R = e in HA ) are physically nonjustifiable–
complementarity of the different divisions of a composite system.
Once made, a division of a composite system C can be straightforwardly
extended (further ”coarse graining” of C) in accordance with the above
criteria–e.g. A = A1 +A2 + . . ..
Finally, our discussion and conclusions are applicable virtually to any
complex quantum system. However, its relevance to the realistic systems
remains yet to be investigated in the purely quantum-mechanical (”micro-
scopic”) as well as in the mesoscopic context. To this end, it is interesting to
compare our approach and conclusions with the approach of Zanardi et al [5]
and Barnum et al [6]. A common element of [5] and our considerations is the
notion on the importance of interaction in the composite system in defining
the subsystems. While this is a conclusion in [5], we still use this plausible
notion (stemming from the decoherence theory) in developing the general
models of our analysis. The approach of Zanardi et al [5] is based on cer-
tain axioms referring to the ”experimentally accessible observables”, which
is yet an open issue of our approach . Our approach is characterized by the
pointing out separability as an operational tool in defining the subsystems,
yet bearing possibly some restrictions onto the ”macroscopic context”. On
the other side, rejecting the ”reference to a preferred subsystem decomposi-
tion” of a composite system, Barnum et al [6] seem essentially to point to
the relativity of the concept of ”subsystem”–in analogy with our conclusion.
However, being an operational analysis of entanglement, their paper does not
directly tackle the issue of ”what is system”. Nevertheless, we believe, that
the conclusions of [5, 6] are consistent with our conclusions, which still follow
from the foundations of the decoherence theory.
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